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Considering climate change and globalization together as a
research topic can illuminate the structures and processes of
both. Globalization and climate change theories can be
categorized as economic, political, and cultural on one
dimension, and on another dimension as emphasizing the
conflicts between the global and national/local levels, the
dominance of the global, or the hybrids and pastiches created
by mixing the global and local. Climate change, as an issue
that creates and is created by a global sense of the world, is
bound up in both its analysis and its policy proposals with the
same issues that confront globalization theorists. The
proliferation of theories and analyses in globalization and
climate change reflects the emerging nature of both areas of
social scientific thought. Activities and “flows” are changing
too rapidly to be satisfactorily categorized and mapped.
Moreover, there are no clear advantages to one form of action,
since all phenomena are multifaceted, with bundled positive,
neutral, and negative characteristics. However, the very
explosion of ideas and proposals reflects the energy and
willingness to seek future directions that will bring increased
well-being for both humans and the environment.
In separate literatures, globalization theorists invoke climate change
as part of a vague and black-boxed globalized environment, and
climate change analysts both blame globalization for environmental
problems and attempt to mobilize support for environmental causes
through appeals to global citizenship and responsibility. Although
globalization has enabled climate change to become a point of
debate and climate change has contributed to the definition of
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globalization, neither contains the other. Climate change has strong
ties to the cultural aspects and issues of globalization (especially
in the domain of science), but more local economic and political
issues play large roles in the debates about the sources,
consequences, and possible policies of climate change. The
concepts relevant to globalization often gain definition from the
ways they are revealed in more concrete problem spaces, and
climate change, as a global problem par excellence, reveals the
shape and mechanisms of globalization as well as defining potential
responses.
In this paper I want to discuss the links and distinctions between
global climate change and globalization in their economic, political,
and cultural dimensions. My argument is that considering climate
change and globalization together as a research topic can illuminate
the structures and processes of both.
The paper first discusses and maps current globalization theories,
then theories about climate change. For each topic, theories fall
largely (but not purely) into economic, political, and cultural
categories. Within each of these categories, a theory may
characterize conflict between globalism and nationalism/localism,
a domination of global over national or local institutions, or the
formation of global-national-local hybrids or pastiches. These
theory maps will allow me to draw some tentative conclusions
about the relationship between globalization and climate change,
and the implications for climate change activities.
Approaches to Theorizing Globalization
Two widely cited definitions of globalization are those of Robertson
and Giddens. Giddens (1990:64) defines globalization as “the
intensification of worldwide social relations which link distant
localities in such a way that local happenings are shaped by events
occurring many miles away and vice versa.” Robertson’s definition
includes both the compression of the world and the intensification
of consciousness of the world as a whole and focuses on
globalization as a “massive, two-fold process involving the
interpenetration of the universalization of particularism and the
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particularization of universalism” (Robertson 1992:100).
Robertson criticizes Giddens for thinking of globalization as a
consequence of modernity and asserts that, in contrast,
globalization is a general condition that facilitated modernity.
However, both definitions of globalization refer to connections at
a distance and the relationship of things at difference scales. Both
the structure and process of globalization are viewed in different
spheres of the social.
Two ways to classify approaches to globalization form a 3x3 matrix
(Table 1). (I will later use this same matrix to categorize views on
climate change.) The first classification is that of the social sphere:
economics, politics, and culture. The second classification
characterizes the relationship of globalization to nationalism or
localism: the national and local resist the global, the global
dominates the local, or global and local coexist as hybrids or
pastiches. Table 1 shows examples of the intersections of these
two classification schemes. I will discuss the two dimensions
generally, then in more detail, organizing my discussion according
to the intersections under each column heading, while recognizing
that no example is purely in one category in either axis.
Table 1. Dimensions of Globalization and Examples
Economic Political Cultural
globalization globalization globalization
Global versus Nationalization Resistance to Separatism of
national or local of multinational  WTO, jihad native groups
industry
Global domination Flexible Transnational Commodification
in content/form specialization, social movements, of local cultures,
capitalist crisis standard state McDonaldization
forms
Hybrids and Western goods “Global village,” Blended musical
pastiches sold at bazaars, global “-scapes” forms
risks
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Theorists approach globalization as a process and a product within
the broad spheres of social life: economic, political, and cultural.
The economic approach focuses on the increasingly global nature
of capitalism, with multinational companies, international markets,
and a transnational financial system. A second, politically oriented
strain of globalization theory examines its relationship to
nationalism, using globalization to illuminate the changing role
and power of the nation-state, particularly since the end of the
Cold War. A third approach examines the broad cultural
implications of globalization. None of these approaches is
exclusive, of course, but typically one dimension is seen as
dominant, if not determinative.
A second way to categorize globalization theories is on the basis
of whether they emphasize differences between globalization and
something else (global versus local, or global versus national) or
the interpenetration of global and local or national elements. The
emphasis on differences tends to draw boundaries and describe
conflicts, while the emphasis on interpenetration tends to describe
ways in which the global swamps the local or elements from global/
national/local become compounds or mixtures.
Globalization of the Economic System
Economics dominates many discussions of globalization. Most
globalization theorists focus on global economic forms and
organizations (e.g., multinational firms) as replacing national and
local economic activities, and the diversity of markets and goods
that result from the introduction of global products and forms to
localities. Nations and locales may resist global economic flows
(e.g., by nationalizing foreign business or forbidding American
fast food restaurants) or come to be dominated by them (e.g., as
multinationals seek new markets and countries seek economic
development).
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Countries may resist or be unable to participate in economic
globalization forces. Economic development theorists explore the
factors involved in managing the process, along with the reasons
for persistent non- or under-development. Easterly’s (1999) recent
analysis of the resistance of countries to World-Bank-style
development demonstrates the error of targeted, single strategies
for development, such as investments in machines, education,
population control programs, and providing foreign aid. He focuses
on countries that show no positive results after decades of foreign
investment – countries that have resisted development. Such
countries, he says, lack incentives such as good governments and
economic institutions would be able to provide; notably, he does
not neglect the role of luck in economic development.
Theorists such as Piore and Sable (1984), Wallerstein (1974, 1983),
and Harvey (1990)1 focus on globalization as associated with
capitalism. Capitalism’s growth orientation, exploitation of labor,
and technological and organizational dynamism lead to
overaccumulation. Increasingly, this overaccumulation is managed
by absorption through temporal or spatial displacement. Temporal
displacement comprises exploring future uses and speeding
turnover of goods, while spatial displacement involves finding new
geographic or other spaces for production and consumption.
Managing overaccumulation in these ways results in a trend away
from Fordist production to what Piore and Sabel call flexible
specialization, meaning decentralized technologies that can
produce a range of products for different customers (e.g., specialty
steels). Piore and Sabel contrast the hegemonic Fordist system to
flexible specialization and speculate that the latter may come to
be dominant. Both, however, are global systems. Harvey sees an
increasingly diverse mix of global economic systems, reflecting
expanded market coordination, changing composition in the
workforce, an “extraordinary efflorescence and transformation in
financial markets” (Harvey 1990:194), and a weakened but still
powerful state.
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In Wallerstein’s analysis of the economic world system, national
and local contribute to the global because they are part of it. Since
Wallerstein’s basic viewpoint is of a global system, globalization
is his starting point; the results are his focus. He sees the global
economic system as having reached a crisis, brought upon by the
internal contradictions of capitalist civilization: dilemmas of
accumulation, political legitimation, and the geocultural agenda
(Wallerstein 1983). He foresees “explosions in all directions,”
economic/political/cultural disorder followed by a reordering of
some type—perhaps neo-feudalism, democratic fascism, or
decentralized and egalitarian world order.
The third type of economic globalization theory sees the advent of
global goods at local markets (Abu-Lughod 1997). Equally, global
“bads” such as global environmental problems (Yearley 1996) and
global risks produced by industrialization (Giddens 1991, Beck
1992, Sachs 2000) arrive at all national and local places. For
example, localities experience the threat of nuclear fallout, sea
level rise, air pollution, and industrial runoff—all products of the
global industrial system – although the localities themselves have
not produced nuclear bombs nor emitted vast quantities of
greenhouse gases nor initiated industrial plants.
Political Globalization
Globalization is often seen politically in opposition to nationalism.
To the extent that the modern nation-state has close ties to the
economic system, the political and economic are intertwined, but
governance can be examined as at least a semi-autonomous
category. Some analysts celebrate the triumphs of the local in the
face of globalization (e.g., Abu-Lughod 1997, Watson 1997) or
warn of the dangers of new ethnic localisms (e.g., Barber 1995,
Kaplan 1994). Many theorists describe dominance of globalization
processes or, at least, major accommodations of national and local
political institutions. Hybrids and pastiches of political institutions
also exist, part global, part national.
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Focusing on the conflict between the state and global governance
organizations, Mann (1993) sees the nation-state as actually
strengthening its role on the international scene. As international
bodies such as the United Nations and the European Union attempt
to coordinate various national interests, the national actors have
important powers to change or veto proposed actions. Moreover,
local ethnic forces (Barber 1995, Appadurai 1996) can assert
themselves and be real (irrational and terroristic) dangers to the
world order. The protests at World Trade Organization (WTO)
meetings are an example, as are the terrorist attacks on the United
States in September 2001.
Meyer (1999) points to the domination of globalized forms of the
nation-state. Modern states are isomorphic, have the same
organizations, and “are constituted and constructed as ultimately
similar actors under exogenous universalistic and rationalized
cultural models” (Meyer 1999:137). Similarly, Thomas and Meyer
(1984) see the dominant global system as constructing isomorphic
systems such as education for citizenship, citizens with rights to
improved welfare, the family as part of the political order, and the
political roles of scientists and professionals as agents and
legitimators of the state.
Also emphasizing the theme of global domination in the political
dimension, Hobsbaum (1990) sees globalization’s emphasis on
competition as undermining the ability of states, particularly
Western liberal democracies, to protect and provide for the welfare
of their citizens. More and more, elites are choosing to opt out of
their nationally based solidarities with poor and disadvantaged in
their own nations, joining their counterparts in global and more
affluent groups, resulting in “global rich” and “global poor.”
Globalization is not the only threat to state protective power
(fragmentation of states is another), but it is perhaps the most
serious. Supranational economic forces (e.g., McDonaldization)
and institutions (e.g., banks) operate with little reference to the
state, and electronic communications have rendered state
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boundaries irrelevant (see also Appadurai 1996). The role of the
state in redistributing wealth among its citizens has been greatly
weakened, with nothing to take its place. Galtung (1997:190) takes
this argument further, saying that a globalized world will hold
“larger domains for structures and cultural meanings” that “imply
thinner scopes and more reliance on least common denominators.
… Here are no Greeks, no Jews; no women, no men: we are all
one in Coca-Cola.”
Agreeing, Stuart Hall (1997) proclaims that the new globalization
is American. The manifestations of globalization are world
organization, global environmental problems, and world markets.
However, with the decline of nations and nationalism, “one can
see a regression to a very defensive and highly dangerous form of
national identity which is driven by a very aggressive form of
racism” (Hall 1997:26). That is, globalization has created its own
reactionary forces (Wallerstein 1999).
Appadurai (1996) exemplifies the view of global culture as a
melding of formerly localized processes, now globalized. He
describes a global system that is constituted, not by nations any
longer, but by five elements that flow into and around each other:
groups of people (ethnoscapes), technology (technoscapes), capital
(financescapes), communications (mediascapes) and images
(ideoscapes). He sees globalization as “a deeply historical, uneven,
and even localizing process” that “does not necessarily or even
frequently imply homogenization or Americanization” (Appadurai
1996:17).
Globalization of Culture
There are, as for economics and politics, three ways to relate global
culture to local cultures. First, global and local cultures may
compete in specific places; separatist ethnic groups resisting
“tourism” is one good example (see Friedman 1990 on the
Hawaiian Ainu). Second, globalization may mean that all culture
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becomes global, a melding of local cultures. This implies cultural
imperialism, American culture being the most frequent nominee
(Ritzer and Malone 2000). In another form of global domination,
global culture may mean the organization or structure of many
cultures, so that the content differs but the commodification
processes and systems remain similar for each culture; one
manifestation of this theoretical perspective is the “culture follows
structure” argument. Third, global culture may simply be one
additional culture, to be examined alongside national and local
cultures, with no particular hierarchy involved; one can pick and
choose from global, national, and local products (and identities).
Robertson (1995) asserts the persistence of resistance to
globalization by summarizing the arguments against cultural
imperialism, citing four counter-factors: (1) “global” messages are
notoriously subject to differing hearing and interpretations in
various localities; (2) global organizations are tailoring their
messages and products to different locales; (3) national symbolic
resources are increasingly available to international markets; and
(4) cultural flows from developing countries to industrialized
countries are copious. Ritzer (2000) details resistance to American
cultural imperialism in the form of the Slow Food movement,
protests against opening new McDonald’s restaurants, and so on.
Anthony Smith (1990) discusses cultural imperialisms. The current
model, he says, is eclectic, unity in diversity; we can expect a
standard production-and-consumption system with watered-down
“folk” content from many national and local cultures. Ritzer and
Malone (2000) elaborate on the standard production-and-
consumption system, part economics and part culture, that the
United States exports in the forms of McDonaldization, credit cards,
Disney Worlds, “eatertainment” establishments, and shopping
malls. Hall (1997), in consonance with this analysis, declares that
the international language is English, and American culture is
everywhere.
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Robertson (1992, 1995) sketches the outlines of a global world
that is highly diverse yet highly conscious of its holistic character.
He stresses the simultaneity of the global and local Robertson
(1992:100). Modern transportation and communication enable
people everywhere to see places around the world as easily as
places next door to them—and to experience different cultures,
environments and conditions (even—or maybe especially—war
and famine) via print and electronic media. The McLuhan phrase
“global village” captures this sense of the world as a small place
where most people are aware of their neighbors. Under
globalization, says Robertson, people realize that the world holds
more “others,” who are experienced as highly diverse yet virtually
present.
Hannerz (1990, 1997) argues that world culture “is marked by an
organization of diversity rather than by a replication of uniformity”
(Hannerz 1990:237). Late Western capitalism “exports culture to
peripheral countries.” Global homogenization may happen by
gradual saturation, although local cultures will reshape Western
culture to their own needs. The cross-national network of social
relationships is the organizing impulse that connects diverse local
cultures. “Cosmopolitans,” people who take on roles in many
cultures (unlike the “locals” who want to stay at home wherever
they go), help to provide coherence to the world culture.
Abu-Lughod (1997), in response to Hannerz, rejects a simplistic
core-to-periphery analysis. On the one hand, developing countries
contribute more equally to global hybrids, such as in the melding
of Western rock music and Bedouin “dancing horse” patterns (cf.
Garcia Canclini 1995 and Pieterse 1995). On the other hand,
developed niches occur in many places around the globe, for
example, Tunis, with its Gucci and couture sweatshops and its
modern Census office. Watson (1997) details the ways in which
local and national cultures domesticate the McDonald’s restaurants
that arrive in various East Asian cities.
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Seeing global and more local cultures as pastiches, Featherstone
(1990:2) speaks of global culture “in terms of the diversity, variety
and richness of popular and local discourses, codes and practices
which resist and play-back systemicity and order.” Far from giving
us a universally homogenous culture, globalization defines a space
in which the world’s cultures rub elbows and generate new
meanings and understandings. Featherstone and Lash (1995:2)
delineate a world in which “international social, political and
cultural (for example, the media) organizations are standing
alongside and beginning to replace their national counterparts.”
They see every culture in the mix, so that it is possible to discuss
Americanization, Europeanization, Japanization—and even
Brazilianization.
Contributions of Theorists to Understanding Globalization
Globalization theorists have explored a wide range of possible
social relations resulting from contemporary processes and
products of globalization (including the possibility that
globalization is not unique in history nor so pervasive as is usually
thought; see Hirst 1997 and Henwood 1999).
The economic analyses allow us to see (and perhaps counter) the
implications of a global economy, including the disadvantages to
workers of flexible specialization (e.g., uncertain, intermittent
work; greater mechanization), the inequalities of global trade, and
the continuing domination of core economies.
As nation-states continue to be established, they use the established
state forms whether or not their history and culture allow these
forms to be successful; furthermore, poor and new states struggle
for (or against) the “benefits” of economic development. The
politically oriented insights of globalization theory help us to
understand these processes and (hopefully) to see ways to improve
global well-being. Also, globalization theories add to explanations
of global social movements such as those concerned with the
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environment, feminism, and implications of “free” world trade; in
order to be successful, such social movements must espouse valid
transnational (global) principles yet relate them to what’s happening
in each locale.
In the cultural dimension, globalization theories provide
descriptions and insights about how the process of identity
formation is changing. Hannerz’ (1990) characterization of
“cosmopolitans” and “locals” is one example; these ideal types of
identity are polar responses to globalization. Friedman’s
dichotomous types (1990) include les sapeurs in the People’s
Republic of Congo, who combine Paris fashions with local status,
and the Hawaiian Ainu, who exemplify cultural separatism. Another
view is that of Robertson (1992), who analyzes how people
constitute their identities by connecting to global-level groups on
the basis of, e.g., gender, profession, interest in humankind (perhaps
in social movements), or economic group. A third possibility is
Stuart Hall’s vision of individual identities being formed out of
bits and pieces of national and ethnic cultures in a kind of bricolage.
A relatively pessimistic view is taken by Castells (1997: 365), who
sees the “dissolution of shared identities” and the rise of nonsocial
identities in “basic instincts, power drives, self-centered strategic
calculations” and power-hungry remnants of state structures. The
future of resistance identities, such as the women’s movement,
religious groups, and environmental movements, is uncertain.
Approaches to Theorizing Climate Change
Global climate change, or “global warming,” as it is sometimes
termed,2 is simultaneously an exemplar of globalization and a type
of universalization that transcends globalization. It may be the result
of capitalism/consumerism (an economic dimension), modernity
(a political/governance dimension), or science itself (a cultural
dimension).
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The scientific narrative about climate change usually begins with
Svante Arrhenius, a Swedish chemist who at the turn of the
twentieth century hypothesized that increasing levels of carbon
dioxide in the atmosphere would cause Earth’s climate to become
warmer. But it was not until after World War II that general and
specific factors enabled scientists to investigate the link between
carbon dioxide (and other radiatively active gases) and changes in
Earth’s climate. The scientific factors include improved and
expanded measurements, and advances in computational power.
During the postwar period, countries were actively seeking
international scientific cooperation, which resulted in a global
network of atmospheric observing and measurement stations under
the newly formed World Meteorological Organization (WMO). In
1958, the International Geophysical Year, David Keeling began
measuring the level of carbon dioxide in the atmosphere over
Mauna Loa; this record clearly showed rising levels. Meanwhile,
computer models of the climate system were being developed, first
of the atmosphere, then the ocean. By the 1970s the US Department
of Energy and other agencies were sponsoring climate model runs
of increased atmospheric carbon dioxide. The 1980s and 1990s
showed increasing levels of research, at both national and
international scales. The central scientific organization in this area,
the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) was
formed in 1988 under the auspices of the United Nations
Environment Programme and the WMO.
But these scientific activities unfolded in a historical context of
globalization. After World War II, the United Nations was organized
and the Bretton Woods system of international finance came into
being. After the beginning of the Cold War, the United States sought
national security through international scientific and political
cooperation. The stage was thus set for political, economic, and
cultural globalization (led, in the “free world,” by the United States)
and for scientific investigations of climate change (and other
“global” problems).
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Most discussions of globalization that include the environment as
a topic include climate change in a list of global environmental
changes, such as the ozone layer, biodiversity, sustainable
development, pollution and overfishing in the oceans, and acid
rain. Although he acknowledges and maps the diversity of
environmental organizational types, Castells (1997) treats these
problems and their associated groups together as “the
Environmental Movement” and points to its influence on
governance, corporations, and individual identities as
environmentalists. Further, the environmental movement is a prime
example of the network society, with “a direct correspondence
between the themes put forward by the environmental movement
and the fundamental dimensions of the new social structure, the
network society” (Castells 1997:122). These themes include a love-
hate attitude toward science and technology, which are
simultaneously the source of many environmental problems and
the source of information about them; control over space and an
emphasis on locality; control over time in a “glacial time”
perspective; and a view of the global unity of species and matter
as a whole.
However, Miller and Edwards (2001:3) argue that climate change
“can no longer be viewed as simply another in a laundry list of
environmental issues; rather, it has become a key site in the global
transformation of world order.” The new regimes and institutions
constructed around the issue of climate change are extensive,
reaching from science to policy to grassroots movements and
raising hotly debated questions about whose knowledge is used
and who speaks for Nature.
Climate change too can be analyzed in the three-by-three matrix
used in the discussion of globalization (see Table 2).
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Table 2. Dimensions of Climate Change.
Economic aspects Political aspects Cultural aspects
of climate change of climate change of climate change
Global versus GATT, ITO, Modern Concern for
national or local NAFTA, etc. v. bureaucracy global climate v.
national clashes with issues of
environmental national traditions, responsibility for
standards e.g., Chipko the problem and
movement equity between
nations
Global domination Capitalist world Transnational Western science
in content/form system mires social and scientists
some nations in movements, define the
poverty & standard state problem
vulnerability to forms, “ecological & solutions
climate change  modernization”
Hybrids and Emissions trading Green parties “Local
pastiches systems, seek to reduce knowledge”
ecological emissions added to
economics, scientific
sustainability knowledge
Economic Globalization and Climate Change
In the economic dimension, climate change and other
environmental issues raise questions about the values of the
capitalist production system and its tendency to favor here-and-
now benefits over delayed but more uncertain benefits (the so-
called high discount rate). The capitalist system is global, and the
logic and operating principles of this global system swamp any
local, traditional economies it may come in contact with. Free trade,
universal access to markets, and economic efficiency are the
explicit pathways to Western/Northern-style prosperity and well-
being. Furthermore, capitalist enterprises produce both goods and
environmental degradation. The world cannot have the good life
without the bad environment. Finally, the production of
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environmental bads is a direct function of the capitalist need to
use “free” resources in order to accumulate capital (Saurin 1996,
Wallerstein 1999). Efforts to “value” the environment (e.g., the
“polluter pays principle”) are steadfastly resisted or, when
resistance is futile, such costs are passed on to consumers.
Wallerstein (1999) opines that the need of capitalist enterprises
for free natural resources is so great that environmental economics
is contributing to the fall of capitalism. Governments can and are
buying time by such strategies as shipping wastes to a politically
weaker South and constraining growth in newly industrializing
countries. But eventually there are only three options: (1) force
businesses to pay all costs, resulting in drastically reduced profits;
(2) make governments pay, resulting in large tax increases and
probably a profit squeeze from reduced consumption; or (3) do
nothing and face various ecocatastrophes. In this discussion, it is
difficult to separate climate change from other environmental
issues, especially those considered “global.”
Tied to issues of economic globalization is the concept of
sustainable development, which includes climate as one feature
of the world that should not be degraded for future generations.
Redclift (2000) articulates three views of the links between
economic growth and sustainability.
1. They may be more or less compatible, recognizing the need
for international regulations protecting endangered species
and ecosystems.
2. They may be totally incompatible; as Daly (1992:200)
says, “sustainable growth is an oxymoron.”
3. Their compatibility may depend on how we define such
crucial variables as “wealth,” “the needs of future
generations,” and “economic efficiency”; certainly we
need to switch priorities and put sustainability first.
All three views recognize that unchecked economic globalization
will continue to exacerbate (if it does not cause) problems such as
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climate change, indoor pollution, household and industrial wastes,
water availability, air quality, and extinction of species. However,
only the second view holds that economic growth is the cause of
many global problems. According to this view, we cannot manage
our way out of climate change (and other global environmental
problems); we must dismantle the capitalist system and re-become
just another of Nature’s species in a world of multiple mutual
dependencies. The first and third views retain capitalist institutions
and processes. The first view leaves economic change in the
driver’s seat; either climate change regulations are add-ons or – in
the view of economists such as Ausabel (1990) – the fact that people
are accumulating wealth and technoscientific knowledge will allow
them to mitigate or adapt to whatever climatic changes may come.
The third view is more aggressive about tinkering with the present
system, putting sustainability ahead of profit as the primary
criterion for making choices. This reorientation may be
accomplished through ecological economic principles, which are
based on the writings of Mancur Olson, Kenneth Boulding, and
others; environmental goods such as clean air, water supplies,
forests, scenery, and biodiversity must enter the market system
and be valued so they are not degraded. Alternatives to the
calculation of gross domestic products include the net national
product (NNP), which subtracts depreciation costs from
nonrenewable resources (Solow 1991); the new economic welfare
(NEW) approach, which subtracts items such as the unmet cost of
pollution and the disamenities of urbanization (Tobin and Nordhaus
1972); and the Genuine Progress Report, which discounts the cost
of products that result from environmental degradation (Cobb,
Halstead and Rowe 1995). (See Yohe and Cantor 1998 for other
examples.)
Political Globalization and Climate Change
Global political issues under the label of “modernity” have been
held up as the all-purpose cause of climate change. In the political
dimension, the global and national are almost conflated. Indeed,
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the global modern has also created the nation-state; nation-states
are constituted and organized according to a global template (Meyer
1999), which includes an environmental ministry or agency.
Modernity substitutes centralized technocrative governance and
institutional engineering for traditional systems of all kinds.
Specific governing principles accompany this replacement:
utilitarianism, free markets as productive of the highest human
welfare, and rational actors. This is the political system that
reinforces globalization and allows unchecked greenhouse gas
emissions, especially from energy production and land-use change,
two primary mechanisms of both modernization.
The governance accompaniment to “sustainable development,”
which focuses on changing the present system, is ecological
modernization. In this view, a great mistake of modernity was to
define the environment (Nature) as external to human societies
and their production/consumption systems. The “human
exemptionalist paradigm” (HEP), which expresses the assumption
of most social theorists up to the 1980s that humans are exempt
from natural constraints, needed to be replaced with a “new
environmental paradigm” (NEP) that encompasses humans and
their natural environment together (see Catton and Dunlap 1978,
1980). One reaction to this insight is “de-modernization theory”
(Spaargaren 2000), an aspiration to a green society of small
communities that live in harmony with nature and the natural
climate. Another is ecological modernization, which seeks to update
modernization by including the environment (for example, clean
air and water) along with other factors of production and the costs
of environmental damage along with other costs of production.
This is ecological economics, but it has strong implications for
modern governance. In essence, we can repair this mistake of
modernity by enlarging modernity to including the management
of environmental resources as well as societies. Ecological
modernization posits the potential for controlled, sustainable
growth that can yield both economic prosperity and no
environmental damage (as expressed in the slogans “win-wins,”
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win-win-wins” [the “triple bottom line”], and “pollution prevention
pays”). In climate change, ecological modernization is the theory
that underpins proposed policies like emissions trading schemes
and tax breaks for renewable energy industries and technologies.
The formation and organization of the modern nation-state have
overturned the culture and customs of native peoples, many of
whom had lived sustainably on their land. That is, modernization
upsets the balance of natural and social systems, and causes
environmental degradation of all kinds, including greenhouse gas
emissions. Scott (1998) details the modernist horrors of
villagization in Tanzania and Russia as well as modernist cities
such as Brasilia. Davis (2001) provides a recent example of this
view, with the added force of colonialism. He analyzes the
devastating results of bringing India and China into world markets;
the forcible breakdown of various traditional systems resulted in
massive starvation and death when severe droughts occurred.
Specific climate change examples focus on the inequalities of the
world-system, now intensified by climate change. Industrialized
countries are responsible for the historic emissions that are the
cause of the steep rise in atmospheric greenhouse gases. But the
resulting climate change impacts will largely be felt in the tropics,
where most of the poor and non-industrialized countries lie (see,
for example, Agarwal and Narain 1991). Here the global modern
swamps the national/local, with negative results for the
environmental and the already-poor. Boehmer-Christiansen (2003)
shows that a proposed global transition to “green” fuels and
technologies in order to mitigate climate change will similarly and
disproportionately disadvantage poor groups and nations. Sachs
(2000), in discussing the prospects for sustainability, notes that
economic and political globalization, with an “openness” that few
poor nations can exploit, fosters a new colonization of Nature; as
poor countries fall into debt, they are forced to sell the products of
“free” natural resources. O’Brien and Leichenko (2000) dub this
situation the “double exposure” of the poor to economic
globalization and to climate change.
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Another facet of the political dimension is that social and political
theorists have taken the nation-state to be both the unit of analysis
and the unit of governance in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries
(Vogler and Imber 1996). “Realist” views of the anarchy in the
international sphere assume that no global authority will gain
legitimacy in governing environmental matters. International
relations (IR) theory, having been dominated by (neo)realism, views
all global environmental changes, including climate change, as
items on the international agenda – and secondary items at best,
after the perennial items of war, security and national self-interest
(Saurin 1996). International institutionalists, such as Paterson
(1996) add extra-governmental institutions to the mix, while
retaining the focus on political processes.
With regard to the environment, countries have achieved
international agreements codified in treaties and conventions, but
implementation has fallen far short of what is envisioned in, for
example, the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change
(1992). Redclift (2000) calls this a crisis of authority, since
organizations such as the United Nations lack legitimacy necessary
for implementation, monitoring, and enforcement. Furthermore,
international agreements depend upon individual nation-states to
implement the terms of the agreement. However, the nation-state
may in fact be too small to effectively meet global environmental
challenges and too big to implement appropriate policies at local
levels.3 Saurin (1996), among others, noting that global is not a
synonym for international, calls for new institutions capable of
dealing with the ordering processes involved in the scale, spread,
complexity, and dynamics of global environmental changes.
Cultural (Scientific) Globalization and Climate Change
Science is the principal cultural element involved in climate change
issues. Science is associated with larger issues of knowledge
production and use. And, indeed, relegating science to the cultural
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realm, along with fashion, film, and fast food, runs the danger of
minimizing its close interrelationships with both the capitalist
system and modern governance.4 Beck (1992[1986]) uses the
concept of the risk society to integrate the three dimensions I have
separated into analytic categories. Risks are the “wholesale product
of industrialization”; they are revealed by scientific investigation,
which also promises their resolution; and they prompt a
“reorganization of power and authority” in the attempted political
management of both politicized nature and society (Beck
1992[1986]:21 and 24).
Nevertheless, science plays a special role in global climate change
related to the problem itself and to the nature of scientific
knowledge and its uses. Science has constructed the problem and
constructed it as a global problem with at least some human causes
in the emissions of so-called greenhouse gases. As a scientific issue,
climate change was “discovered” by advances in scientific
understanding and methodology, and computational capacity, as
outlined earlier.
Of course, these scientific methods and conclusions are the subject
of intense debate. Perhaps the measurement of greenhouse gases
does not represent the global atmosphere; there is uncertainty about
emissions of greenhouse gases, particularly from land-use changes;
the models, because they are global models, cannot be verified
and may neglect important processes; and the current warming
trend may be unrelated to human activities and more dependent
upon sunspot cycles, for example (see Edwards 2001, Norton and
Suppe 2001). The issues of “globalizing science” relate to
generalizing from localized experiments or data; Jasanoff and
Wynne (1998) provide an account of the processes and issues
involved in globalizing climate change science.
Global climate change is global in its very nature, unlike earlier
problems with far-ranging relevance. Pasteur’s work, for example,
had global relevance, because wherever contagious disease is
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present his constructs can be applied. But Pasteur did not need to
collect data on a global system like the climate system but rather
to replicate his experiments and hygienic practices at multiple
locations. In contrast, the global climate system must be considered
as a whole. Storms in the Pacific Ocean drive much of the weather
that much of the world experiences. Emissions of carbon dioxide
go into the stocks of the whole atmosphere.
Science is indispensable in discussions about global climate
change. “The debate over environmental change is in large part a
battle in the social construction of knowledge and meaning which
is fought out in a global arena” (Saurin 1996:81). Indeed scientific
research has made it possible for people to think of the globe as a
symbol of a common humanity. The picture of the Earth from space
(the “big blue marble”) has evoked descriptions of its fragility, its
limited resources, and human dependence. Associated images of
Spaceship Earth and Gaia (the sense of the whole Earth as a living
being) join earlier images of Mother Earth with powerful, global
messages to “protect” the Earth and “Love your Mother.” These
are global images, cultural constructions that provide the
appropriate settings for global climate change discussions.
But global climate change has more localized and differentiated
sources and impacts as well. Rich industrialized nations are largely
responsible for increasing concentrations of greenhouse gases in
the atmosphere, especially when historical contributions are
accounted for; these same nations are likely to experience only
mildly negative impacts from climate change, at least over the
course of the next century. However, poorer but industrializing
nations (such as India and China) are contributing an increasing
share of global emissions; these nations, however, are likely to
experience more severe consequences of climate change. Given
this lumpiness, questions arise about whose knowledge counts and
how any knowledge will be used. Prescriptions from industrialized
nations, such as advice to less industrialized nations on “clean
development” and technology-dependent “solutions,” are likely
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to face skepticism. Calls for development assistance without the
strings of capitalist institutions may well fall on deaf ears. The
current state of negotiations on climate change exhibit many
features that a neorealist would recognize, with self-interests
dictating outcomes rather than a game-theoretic recognition that
cooperation may bring advantages for all.
Globalization and Climate Change: More Heat than Light?
What is the relationship between globalization and climate change?
Economic, political, and cultural globalization are deeply
implicated as the causes of climate change and our knowledge
about it. In each dimension, analysts have suggested both “more”
and “less” to meet the challenges of climate change. Milton (1996)
suggests that “the global environmental debate encapsulates the
tension between ‘globaling’ and ‘deglobalizing’ tendencies
identified by Robertson” – that is, we should either promote
globalization as the best way of protecting the environment or
dismantle the global economy and allow localities to control their
own resources. In the economic sphere, capitalism may either be
expanded to account for the input costs of and damages to the
environment, or be superseded by another economic system. In
the political sphere, modernist governance needs to extend itself
to manage the environment along with social systems or retreat to
locally sustainable governments. In the cultural sphere, science
needs to specify methods to mitigate and to adapt to more fully
characterized climate changes, or to lose its hubris and make space
for local knowledges and for moral and ethical approaches to the
issues raised by global climate change.
Climate change, as the limit case of globalization gone wrong,
provides a site where economic, political, and cultural/scientific
issues can be debated. Climate change globalizes the environment
by specifying the connections among what happens in specific
places and the whole climate system. Nongovernmental
organizations and institutions have gone a certain distance toward
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including multiple knowledges and North/South viewpoints. The
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, although dominated
by industrialized-nation scientists, has come to conclusions not in
the interests of their nations. The United Nations Environment
Program and Development Program have had some modest success
in providing assistance to poor nations who are not well adapted
to current climate variability and who face further problems under
long-term climate change. Still, there is little indication that
industrialized nations are preparing to overhaul their systems of
producing energy and goods, and little indication of systematic
planning for adaptations that will be necessary.
The focus of my research is global climate change as a site from
which to analyze the possibilities for global consensus and action.
In this broadly conceptualized research area, cultural approaches
within globalization theories that link global and local views of
desirable human and human/Nature relationships are the most
promising. How identities are formed from global, national, and
local elements and how effective collective institutions (like
epistemic communities [Haas 1992]) are constructed—these are
crucial questions in determining the possibilities for globally shared
values as the basis for policy and action. The political and economic
realities of globalization are established constraints and
possibilities, but social action is located in the abilities of social
movement organizations and individual actors to see clearly and
take advantage of various points of attachment. This is a view that
can draw from and extend the theoretical insights of Robertson
(1992, 1995, 2001). Another fruitful avenue is indicated by Castells,
who sees social movements as having two main agencies: prophets
(both “good” and “bad”) and “a networking, decentered form of
organization and intervention” (Castells 1997:362) that actually
distributes cultural codes in the globalized informational society.
The proliferation of theories and analyses in both globalization
and climate change reflects the emerging nature of both areas of
social scientific thought. Activities and “flows” are changing too
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rapidly to be satisfactorily categorized and mapped. Moreover,
there are no clear advantages to one form of action, since all
phenomena are multifaceted, with bundled positive, neutral, and
negative characteristics. For example, global policy on climate
change could benefit all nations on average but leave specific
groups mired in poverty and at risk of climate change impacts.
However, local initiatives, while empowering stakeholders and
taking advantage of local knowledge, may be limited in resources
and subject to countervailing activities elsewhere (as when forests
are spared in one place but cut down in another). Nongovernmental
organizations can work across national boundaries on sustainable
development programs but be undermined by local and national
governments. “Green” communities reduce their emissions of
greenhouse gases and serve as models for other communities; they
may also be marginalized and powerless to effect change in larger
political spheres.
If this is an incoherent assemblage of activities, it is also a vibrant
and plurivocal one. Climate change forums have provided venues
for many voices to be heard on a global stage, and climate change
concerns have galvanized scientific research, policy debate, and
local action. Sonnenfeld and Mol (2002) point to innovations in
the form of supranational environmental institutions, market-based
environmental regulatory instruments, and the rise of engagement
from a global civil society. Guston (2001) analyzes boundary
organizations in environmental policy and science, including three
climate change studies.
Still, there are important contradictions to be sorted out. An
overwhelming majority of people want a less degraded
environment, and seemingly at the same time everyone wants more
goods and energy to improve the world’s standard of living.5
Governments pay lip service to improving or protecting the
environment, but “the unpalatable implications” (Held et al.
1999:410) of many environmental policies mean that few effective
ones have been enacted and implemented. International institutions
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or nongovernmental organizations may be more matched to the
scale and complexity of climate change, but they do not have the
power “to force compromises, extract significant concessions from
participants or take independent action” (Held et al. 1999:411).
Although it is tempting to resign oneself to expect the reproduction
of existing power structures in the debate about climate change,
history contains examples of large social changes against the
expectations of the powerful; social revolutions that resulted in
democratic governments constitutes an obvious example. Perhaps
future large-scale changes in the economics, politics, and culture
related to climate change will become objects of widespread social
scientific study, as the rise of the nation state is now.
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Notes
1 Havey focuses on culture, but includes a relevant discussion of the
globalization of the economic system.
2 Most physical scientists who perform climate change research think
“global warming” a reductionist term, since climate change includes a
multitude of possible changes, up to and including increased frequency
and intensity of storms, species dislocation and the disruption of the
Atlantic Ocean’s “conveyor belt,” the Gulf Stream.
3 This idea is attributed by Mol 2000 to Lash and Urry, attributed by
Saurin 1996 to Raymond Williams.
4 In this analytic scheme, fashion, film, and fast food are relegated
to the economic sphere as the products of capitalism.
5 Wallerstein (1999:5) suggests that “a lot of them simply segregate
the two demands in their minds.”
